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By Andrew Crockett
A
 number of developments in recent years
have combined to put the issue of finan-
cial stability at the top of the agenda, not
just of supervisory authorities, but of public
policymakers more generally. These develop-
ments include: the explosive growth in the vol-
ume of financial transactions, the increased
complexity of new instruments, costly crises in
national financial systems, and several high pro-
file mishaps at individual institutions.
The growth in the volume of financial trans-
actions and the increasing integration of capital
markets have made institutions in the financial
sector more interdependent and have brought to
the fore the issue of systemic risk. International
capital flows, though generally beneficial for the
efficient allocation of savings and investment,
now have the power in unstable conditions to
undermine national economic policies and desta-
bilize financial systems.
The increased complexity of new instruments
makes it harder for senior management in finan-
cial firms, let alone supervisory authorities, to
understand intuitively the risks to which the
institutions concerned are exposed. There are
fears that the models underlying the pricing of
the new instruments may not be sufficiently
robust, that the mathematics of the models may
have become disconnected from the realities of
the marketplace, or that the operational controls
within financial institutions may be inadequate
to control the resultant risks.
The crises in financial systems that have
occurred have demonstrated the close linkages
between financial stability and the health of the
real economy. In Mexico, for example, what
began as a currency crisis led to a serious reces-
sion and created huge strains in the banking
system, further deepening the recession. The
consequences of the Mexican crisis destabilized
several other Latin American countries, notably
Argentina, and threatened for a while to have
even wider repercussions. In industrial coun-
tries, financial strains in Scandinavia and Japan,
among others, had adverse consequences for the
real economy.
Lastly, there have been a number of well-
publicized losses at individual institutions, due
to the breakdown of operational or other controls.
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ably well contained, demonstrate how quickly
losses can mount, and illustrate the systemic risks
that would be inherent in a larger scale mishap.
The central case for making the health of the
financial system a public policy concern rests on
two propositions: firstly, that, left to itself, the
financial system is prone to bouts of instability;
and secondly, that instability can generate siz-
able negative spillover effects (externalities). It
will be the purpose of this paper to examine
these propositions more closely, and in the light
of this examination, to consider what forms
public policy intervention in the financial sector
might take. More specifically, I will address the
following questions: what do we mean by finan-
cial stability? Why should official intervention
(as opposed to reliance on market forces) be
required to promote stability? And what con-
crete approaches can be employed? 
I. WHAT IS FINANCIAL STABILITY?
A distinction is commonly made nowadays
between monetary stability and financial stability
(interestingly, this distinction would not have
been so easily recognized a generation ago,
either by economists or public officials). Monetary
stability refers to the stability of the general
price level; financial stability to the stability of
the key institutions and markets that go to make
up the financial system. While these are concep-
tually separate objectives of policy, the linkages
between the two are now increasingly recognized.
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The debate on monetary stability has pro-
gressed further and its definition has reached a
greater degree of consensus than is the case with
financial stability. Nobody disputes that the
avoidance of excessive inflation is an appropri-
ate objective. And nobody doubts that it is public
policy (specifically, monetary policy) that ulti-
mately determines the inflation rate. Remaining
debates, as became evident last year at Jackson
Hole, surround issues such as how to accurately
measure inflation; what, within a relatively nar-
row range (usually 1-3 percent), should be con-
sidered an optimal inflation rate; whether the
objective should be expressed in terms of the
inflation rate or the price level, and how quickly
one should return to price stability after having
been forced away from it.
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No such general consensus applies in the case
of the definition of financial stability. For the
time being, at least, each writer can supply his
own. In my case, I will take financial stability to
apply to both institutions and markets. In other
words, stability requires (i) that the key institu-
tions in the financial system are stable, in that
there is a high degree of confidence that they can
continue to meet their contractual obligations
without interruption or outside assistance; and
(ii) that the key markets are stable, in that par-
ticipants can confidently transact in them at
prices that reflect fundamental forces and that
do not vary substantially over short periods
when there have been no changes in fundamentals.
This does not, however, provide a full definition.
Which are the “key institutions” whose stability
is important? And what is the degree of price
stability in financial markets that is required? 
Stability in financial institutions means the
absence of stresses that have the potential to
cause measurable economic harm beyond a
strictly limited group of customers and counter-
parties. Occasional failures of smaller institu-
tions, and occasional substantial losses at larger
institutions, are part and parcel of the normal
functioning of the financial system. Indeed, they
serve a positive function by reminding market
participants of their obligation to exercise disci-
pline over the activities of the intermediaries
with whom they do business.
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means the absence of price movements that
cause wider economic damage. Prices can and
should move to reflect changes in economic
fundamentals. And the prices of assets can often
move quite abruptly when something happens
to cause a reassessment of the future stream of
income associated with the asset, or the price
at which this income stream should be dis-
counted. It is only when prices in financial
markets move by amounts that are much
greater than can be accounted for by funda-
mentals, and do so in a way that has damaging
economic consequences, that one is justified
in talking about “instability” or “crisis” in the
financial system.
A practical issue that is worth addressing at
this point is whether all financial institutions and
all markets should be treated similarly. Are
problems in the banking sector to be consid-
ered in the same light as problems at nonbank
financial institutions? Is the failure of a big
bank the same as that of a small bank? And
should central banks be as concerned about
excessive volatility in asset prices as they are
about instability among financial institutions?
These are issues that have been, and remain,
controversial.
Consider first the question of which institu-
tions are important for financial stability. This
raises two further issues: are banks special? And
are some institutions “too big to fail”? Two
reasons are usually given for believing that
banks warrant special treatment in the preserva-
tion of financial stability.
3 The first is that banks’
liabilities are repayable at par on demand, while
their assets are typically comparatively illiquid.
This makes them more liable to runs that cause
illiquidity and even insolvency. The second is
that banks remain responsible for the operation
of the payment system. This means that difficul-
ties at one institution are transmitted, semi-auto-
matically, to the rest of the financial system,
with the risk, at the extreme, that the payments
system could seize up. 
Both of these reasons continue to have force,
though perhaps not to the same extent as pre-
viously. While illiquid loans remain a dispropor-
tionate share of banks’ assets, holdings of
marketable securities have tended to increase.
And the “moneyness” of banks’ liabilities may
have become less of a distinguishing charac-
teristic, as banks increase their reliance on mar-
ketable claims to meet funding requirements,
and nonbank institutions issue liabilities that are
repayable on demand. Banks continue to domi-
nate the payments system, and the failure of one
bank immediately generates losses to those
banks exposed to it in the settlement system.
Cascading losses through these arrangements
have the potential to undermine the payments
systems, which is the basis for monetary exchange
in all economies. But interlocking claims and
settlement exposures among other entities at the
core of the financial system have grown sizably
as nonbank financial intermediaries have come
to greater prominence. These have increased the
potential for knock-on effects among them.
The conclusion is that banks remain “special,”
in that instability in the banking system has a
greater capacity to generate systemic contagion
than difficulties elsewhere in the financial sec-
tor. But the distinctions are becoming more
blurred, with problems at key nonbank institu-
tions having growing potential for significant
spillover consequences.
In many respects size has become more im-
portant than an institution’s formal character in
determining its systemic significance. Regula-
tors frequently deny that there is a “too big to
fail” doctrine. One can understand why they do,
since to make it explicit would court moral
hazard. Still, it is only realistic to recognize that
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system that their failure would constitute a sys-
temic crisis. Their obligations to counterparties
are so large that failure to discharge them would
cause widespread contagion. This group of
institutions includes both banks and nonbanks.
Next, what about price volatility in asset mar-
kets? How much price movement can take place
before we should classify markets as being “un-
stable”? And which markets are of particular
concern for the health of the financial system
and the economy more generally?
There are obviously no hard-and-fast answers
to these questions. Any price movements that
exceed what can be justified on grounds of
changing fundamentals have the potential to
result in resource misallocation. Sustained price
volatility that generates uncertainty, leading to
an unwillingness to enter into long-term con-
tracts, hampers economic performance through
discouraging the mobilization and allocation of
savings through the financial system. And sudden
or sharp price movements that place the liquidity
or solvency of prudently run financial institu-
tions at risk have more immediate dangers.
As to which markets should be the focus of
concern, once again the criterion should be the
capacity to cause wider economic damage.
Financial and other asset markets, because of
their broad linkages to saving and investment
decisions, obviously have a greater potential
impact on other macroeconomic variables than
do developments in markets for goods and serv-
ices. This impact can occur through wealth
effects, as the prices of financial assets change;
through changing the expected returns on sav-
ings and investment; or through generalized
effects on consumer and business confidence.
A further point concerns the capacity for con-
tagion among financial markets. Just as difficul-
ties at one financial intermediary appear to have
the effect of undermining confidence more gen-
erally, so experience suggests that sharp move-
ments in one market can destabilize others.
Examples of this phenomenon include the
broadly similar movements in international
equity prices in 1987, following the price break
on Wall Street; the general upward movement in
bond yields in 1994; and the spread of exchange
rate difficulties in Europe in 1992-93 and in
Southeast Asia in 1997.
In conclusion, there is still no clear-cut defi-
nition of what constitutes financial instability.
What may distinguish the financial system from
other areas of economic activity, however, is
the potential for healthy flexibility to develop—in
a short period of time—into more troublesome
instability and eventually, in extreme circum-
stances, into crisis. This is because precautionary
action taken by individuals in the face of asym-
metric information can in certain circumstances
have the effect of amplifying, rather than damp-
ening, natural volatility. This potential brings us
closer to an understanding of why the mainte-
nance of stability is often considered to be a
natural responsibility of public authorities.
Assessing the point at which movements in
asset prices, or in the financial position of inter-
mediaries, risk becoming self-perpetuating is
obviously a matter of judgment. Because the
costs of mistakes are so high, it is of key impor-
tance to understand the dynamics of the process.
It is also important to come to an assessment of
the ways in which the financial instability inter-
acts with the real economy to intensify (or mod-
erate) an initial shock. It is for this reason that,
whatever the specific arrangements in place in
any country to monitor or underwrite the health
of individual institutions, there needs to be close
cooperation between the authorities responsible
for the supervision of individual institutions,
those responsible for broader systemic stability,
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the real economy.
II. WHY IS OFFICIAL
INTERVENTION REQUIRED TO
PROMOTE STABILITY?
There can be little doubt that financial sta-
bility, properly defined, is a “good thing.” It
creates a more favorable environment for savers
and investors to make intertemporal con-
tracts, enhances the efficiency of financial in-
termediation and helps improve allocation of
real resources. It provides a better environment
for the implementation of macroeconomic pol-
icy. Instability, on the other hand, can have dam-
aging consequences, from the fiscal costs of
bailing out troubled institutions to the real GNP
losses associated with banking and currency
crises.
The only qualification to be made is that
stability must not be confused with rigidity.
Market prices must be allowed to move as sup-
ply and demand conditions change. And finan-
cial institutions should not be prevented from
going out of existence when they are unable to
make a profit. The trick is to permit the neces-
sary flexibility in market prices and structures,
without generating instability that has damaging
consequences on confidence and real economic
activity.
Financial stability is a public good in that its
“consumers” (i.e., users of financial services) do
not deprive others of the possibility of also
benefiting from it. In this sense, public authori-
ties have an interest in seeing that it is “supplied”
in an appropriate quantity. This does not mean,
however, that public authorities should neces-
sarily intervene in financial markets so as to
promote stability. There is no public agency
directly concerned with stability in the market
for foodstuffs or automobiles (although govern-
ments generally accept a responsibility for
health and safety and for competition). Is finance
any different?
It cannot be denied that all financial instability
has costs for someone. The collapse of a finan-
cial firm imposes direct costs on shareholders,
who lose their investment; on employees, who
lose their jobs; and on depositors and unsecured
creditors, whose claims may be forfeit. Instabil-
ity in asset prices creates losses for those whose
investments prove unsuccessful. In this (i.e., the
direct or “private” costs of instability), financial
firms and markets are not qualitatively different
from other sectors of the economy. And while
there are always pressures to compensate pri-
vate losses, it is generally assumed that the
public interest is served best by allowing market
disciplines to work—unless there is evidence of
market failure.
In what follows, I will examine the argument
that the financial system is particularly subject
to market failure, and that the consequences of
such failure justify public policy intervention. It
will be convenient to divide this discussion into
two parts: that concerned with the potential for
instability at financial institutions; and that con-
cerned with excessive volatility in prices in
financial markets.
Instability at financial institutions
The reasons why difficulties at a financial firm
may give rise to public policy concerns may be
grouped under several (overlapping) heads:
(a) Losses to depositors and other creditors
may be exacerbated because of the unique vul-
nerability of financial institutions to “runs.”
(b) The scope for losses to spread to other
financial institutions through “contagion” or
direct exposures is high.
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perceived need to protect depositors or bailout
troubled institutions.
(d) There may be more widespread macro-
economic consequences from instability in the
financial sector.
(e) A loss of confidence in financial interme-
diation may lead to financial “repression” result-
ing in suboptimal levels of savings and
misallocation of investment.
The first two of these points concern the
potential for an “instability bias” in the financial
system; the last three to the external costs gen-
erated by such instability. Let us now consider
them in slightly more detail.
“Runs” and the protection of individual insti-
tutions. There are two broad reasons why the
authorities may wish to be involved with the
stability of individual institutions (other than
contagion risk, which is dealt with below). One
rests on the vulnerability of banks to runs; the
other on economies of scale in monitoring the
behavior of complex firms.
A well-known feature of banks is that they
issue liabilities that are redeemable on demand
at par, while they hold longer term assets that are
less readily marketable and have an uncertain
value. Under normal circumstances, this does
not pose a major problem, since deposit with-
drawals are subject to the law of large numbers
and well-managed loans that are held to maturity
are mostly repaid at face value. A bank’s holding
of capital covers the risk of loan loss, and a
cushion of liquid assets is sufficient to preserve
confidence in its ability to meet withdrawals. 
If, however, something happens to disturb
confidence, the situation can be destabilized.
Depositors perceive that those who withdraw
Table 1
EQUITY PRICES IN 1987 AND BOND YIELDS IN 1994
Equity price movements in
2 weeks of October 1987*
Bond yield rise end-January
through end-July 1994
  (basis  points)†  









* 9th to 23rd October 1987. 
† Ten-year benchmark.
Sources: National sources.
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or penalty; those who delay may find that the
bank’s capital has been eroded by a “fire-sale”
of less marketable assets. What this means is,
firstly, the value of a bank (like other firms) is
greater as a going concern than it is in a forced
liquidation. Secondly, because of the leverage
inherent in banks’ operations, forced liquidation
is more likely than in the case of nonfinancial
firms. This argues in favor of an outside agent
to preserve potentially solvent institutions as
going concerns, or else to intervene to gradually
wind down firms that have become insolvent.
A slightly different argument for intervention
to protect depositors is that they have inadequate
information to protect themselves. Monitoring
financial institutions is costly, and pooled moni-
toring may be more efficient than individual
monitoring. (Note that this argument may apply
to all firms, not just those, like banks, whose
liabilities are repayable at par on demand.) In
this view, the public authorities are performing
a service (like that of a rating agency) that it
would be too difficult or too costly for individual
depositors to perform for themselves. This argu-
ment can be given a political slant by recogniz-
ing that, to be realistic, certain depositors will
always act foolishly when faced with the incen-
tive of high returns. Since political pressure to
provide compensation for losses is bound to
ensue, it is better for the authorities to step in to
avert losses, or rationalize the process by which
compensation is provided. 
“Contagion” effects at other financial institu-
tions. Potentially more serious than the losses
that accrue to individual depositors at a failed
institution is the danger that difficulties may be
propagated more widely. Such contagion can
take place through two main channels: firstly,
the pattern of interlocking claims among finan-
cial institutions; and secondly, the potential for
difficulties at one institution to provoke a loss of
confidence in others thought to be similarly
placed.
There can be little doubt that the exposure of
financial firms to other financial intermediaries
has grown dramatically in recent years. A major
factor has been the increase in trading activities.
Daily foreign exchange trading has increased
threefold over the last decade and stood at $1.25
trillion in 1995. Well in excess of 80 percent of
these trades are between dealing counterparties.
Derivatives and securities trading has grown
even faster and is also dominated by interdealer
activity. The place where the resulting inter-
intermediary exposures get concentrated is the
interlocking network of payments and securities
settlement systems. Although individual expo-
sures are of short duration, at any point in time
they are very large in size. In many cases, the
unsecured exposure of financial institutions to a
single counterparty exceeds capital. It is this fact
that has led some observers to conclude that a
disruption transmitted through the payment sys-
tem is the largest single threat to the stability of
the financial system.
4 
Contagion can also occur indirectly, when
strains at one financial institution provoke a loss
of deposits from, or an unwillingness to enter
into transactions with, other firms that are also
thought to be vulnerable. Following the Barings
collapse, for example, a number of small to
medium-sized investment banks in London and
elsewhere were reported to have suffered de-
posit withdrawals, even though there was noth-
ing to suggest that they had incurred losses
similar to Barings’. In other words, contagion
can be indirectly as well as directly induced.
Contagion is one of the basic reasons why
public authorities are concerned with the health
and survival of individual financial institutions.
This relates to the “public good” aspect of finan-
cial stability. Confidence in the financial system
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ing costs on others. If the failure of one institu-
tion causes a contagious loss of confidence
elsewhere, the adverse consequences to the sys-
tem as a whole may be much greater than those
resulting from the initial disruption.
Resolution costs. Turning now to the spillover
consequences of instability, the transfer costs of
resolving financial crises are the most readily
quantifiable, and in many ways the most strik-
ing. To public policy officials, the costs that fall
on the public budget surely provide the most
persuasive evidence of the need to do whatever
is necessary to strengthen financial systems.
The U.S. public is acutely aware of the savings
and loan debacle of the 1980s, the resolution costs
of which are estimated at anywhere between 2
percent and 4 percent of GDP. These costs,
however, pale in comparison with the fiscal
costs incurred in a number of other countries.
5
In France, the losses incurred by a single bank,
Credit Lyonnais, are now put at some $30 billion,
or over 2 percent of GNP. Honohan estimates the
fiscal costs of resolving crises in developing
countries alone as being as much as $250 bil-
lion.
6 A World Bank Study estimates that 14
countries had to devote more than 10 percent of
GNP to the resolution of banking sector crises
(Table 2).
7 And a by now well-known IMF
study concludes that almost three-quarters of
IMF member countries encountered “signifi-
cant” banking sector problems during the pe-
riod 1980-96; of these as many as one-third
warrant the designation “crisis.”
8 Part of the
resolution costs of these crises fall on the bank-
ing system and its clients. More frequently,
however, the government budget is left to pick
up the lion’s share.
GNP costs of financial instability. The resolu-
tion costs of financial sector crises are, of
course, transfer costs. They cannot be taken as
an accurate guide to losses in economic welfare,
which could be either greater or smaller. They
could be smaller than the transfer costs if the
real assets financed by failed banks remained in
existence and continued to yield productive
services. On the other hand, the cumulative mis-
allocation of financial resources represented by
bad loans suggests that the overall loss to society
from inefficient financial intermediation may
have been even larger than the losses that even-
tually fell on the budget or on the shareholders
and other claimants of banks. How can one go
about assessing the macroeconomic costs of
instability?
Even if instability does not lead to crisis, they
can make it harder for the authorities to gauge
the appropriateness of a given policy stance.
Financial fragility complicates the interpreta-
tion of the indicators used to guide monetary
policy decisions. Somewhat more seriously,
weaknesses at financial institutions can limit the
willingness to lend, thus creating “head winds”
for the expansion of demand. Overall economic
performance suffers as a result.
Where financial difficulties are more serious,
the impact on GNP can be larger and more
direct, whether or not the authorities decide to
support the financial system. In Mexico, for
example, the interaction of financial sector dif-
ficulties and a currency crisis led to a sharp
setback to GNP. By mid-1995 industrial output
in Mexico had fallen 12 percent from its level
two quarters earlier. Even in Argentina, which
successfully defended its exchange rate, GDP is
estimated to have temporarily fallen some 7
percent below trend as a result of the “tequila
effect.” The banking crisis of the 1980s in Chile
saw output growth drop from 8 percent in the
five years preceding the crisis to only 1 percent
in the five years after it.
Among industrial countries, it is harder to
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financial instability and GDP. In the United
States, the savings and loan crisis had little
measurable impact on growth, costly though it
was to the budget. In Nordic countries and in
Japan, the consequences are more readily appar-
ent. Growth in Finland averaged 4.5 percent in
the years preceding the outbreak of the banking
crisis, and was minus 4.0 percent in the three
succeeding years (though doubtless not all of the
difference is attributable to financial difficul-
ties). In Sweden and Norway, there were eco-
nomic downturns following the strains in the
banking system, though again other factors were
also at work. And in Japan, the “head winds”
caused by financial sector weaknesses held
growth in the mid-1990s below the underlying
potential of the economy.
It bears repeating here that the relationship
between financial instability and macroeconomic
instability is two-way. Macroeconomic insta-
Table 2
Country (time period of crisis)
Estimate of total losses/costs

























b Accumulated losses to date. 
c In 1987. 
d In 1983. 
e Estimate of potential losses.
Source: Goldstein (1997) based on Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a).
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culties, often because an unsustainable expan-
sion induces unwise lending. Credit-fueled
“bubbles” in financial asset and property prices
frequently play a contributory role, especially
when a large share of lending is used to finance
the acquisition of real estate or financial assets
whose price is, for a time, rising rapidly.
9 A
recession then reveals serious weakness in lend-
ing portfolios. When the financial system en-
counters difficulties, problems can quickly
worsen macroeconomic performance. Weak-
ened intermediaries cease to lend, losses in the
financial sector create negative wealth or income
effects, generalized uncertainty inhibits invest-
ment, and the public sector is often forced to rein
in real expenditure to help offset the budgetary
cost of increased transfers.
Instability and the development of the finan-
cial sector. Beyond the direct effects of financial
instability on real economic activity, there can
be indirect adverse consequences for longer run
growth potential if financial intermediation is
stunted. As Akerlof has shown, in any market
where participants have asymmetric informa-
tion, moral hazard and adverse selection reduce
exchange below levels that could be beneficial
if market participants had better information
(the market for lemons). The market for intertem-
poral exchange is characterized by extreme
asymmetry of information between providers of
funds and potential borrowers. The potential
negative consequences are, however, offset by
the existence of specialized intermediaries. Fi-
nancial intermediaries perform the role of
agents for lenders, screening out uncreditworthy
borrowers, monitoring borrowers’ performance
after a loan is made, adding creditworthiness
through the commitment of their own capital,
and creating liquidity through providing for the
ready marketability of claims.
All of this, however, depends upon the preser-
vation of confidence in the stability of the net-
work of financial intermediaries: if lenders lose
confidence in the continued stability of the insti-
tutions to whom they have entrusted their funds,
or in the integrity of the markets in which they
have invested, they will seek to reduce their
exposure and place their assets elsewhere. In the
limit, they may choose consumption over sav-
ing, or may place their savings in nonproductive
but “safe” forms (such as precious metals). If
this happens, the contribution of the financial
sector in providing improved methods of risk
pricing and management, and in adding liquidity
and creditworthiness, will be much diminished.
Mishkin indeed defines a financial crisis as “a
disruption to financial markets in which adverse
selection and moral hazard problems become
much worse, so that financial markets are unable
to channel funds efficiently to those who have
the most productive investment opportunities.”
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Instability in financial markets
While there is broad (though not universal)
acceptance that the stability of financial institu-
tions should be an objective of public policy, this
is much less true with regard to financial asset
prices or financial flows. The majority view is
that free markets are the best guarantors of equi-
librium in prices, and that official intervention
should be limited to removing market imperfec-
tions, e.g., by promoting the disclosure of rele-
vant information and preventing the emergence
of monopoly practices. Yet financial markets
can, in principle, be subject to the same kind of
“instability bias” and adverse spillovers that
affect financial institutions.
Instability bias arises if a disturbance affecting
prices generates forces creating further moves
in the same direction. These are generally based
on extrapolative expectations, which can result
from asymmetric information, reinforced by
herd instincts. Certain technical features of mar-
14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYkets, such as margin requirements, can also play
a role. In a rising market, those who invest on
margin find their net worth rising, and are
thereby enabled to make further leveraged pur-
chases, pushing prices still higher. The opposite
effects come into play in a falling market, with
margin calls forcing liquidation of holdings and
exacerbating price declines.
The importance of such instability biases are
very hard to assess on a priori grounds. The
sudden drop in equity prices in 1987 suggests
that they can sometimes be significant, though
the relative infrequency of such occurrences
provides some reassurance. Swings in exchange
rates could be taken as evidence that similar
pressures work in currency markets; though
full-blown currency crises are more apt to be
result of attempts to defend a fixed rate at an
unsustainable level.
Volatility in financial asset prices has the ca-
pacity to create “spillover” effects of various
kinds. Firstly (and perhaps least troublesome),
is the added difficulty it creates for the authori-
ties in formulating macroeconomic policies.
Movements in asset prices influence all of the
channels by which monetary policy traditionally
affects the real economy: the interest rate chan-
nel, the wealth channel, the exchange rate chan-
nel. Moreover, they can, if severe, have
pervasive effects on confidence. There is at pres-
ent a lively debate about whether and how
monetary policy should respond to asset price
movements. The fact that the debate is still
unresolved is evidence of the uncertainties cre-
ated for policymakers when financial markets
are unstable.
Another type of spillover effect occurs when
asset price movements undermine the stability
of financial institutions. This can happen if in-
termediaries are heavily exposed to certain cate-
gories of assets (e.g., equities or real estate), or
if their lending is secured on such assets. It can
also occur if financial institutions have mis-
matched foreign currency or interest rate books,
or if higher volatility suddenly increases the
costs of hedging options positions.
Lastly, asset price volatility can create real
economic costs if the authorities are led to take
extreme measures to restore stability. Perhaps
the most prominent examples of such costs oc-
cur in currency crises. Instability in foreign ex-
change markets is almost invariably
accompanied by sharply higher interest rates in
the country whose currency is under downward
pressure. And higher interest rates usually pro-
voke a downturn in economic activity, whether
accompanied and exacerbated by a financial
sector crisis or not.
What are the specific markets that are particu-
larly vulnerable to instability, and what is the
nature of the spillover effects? Let us briefly
consider four. 
Firstly, the foreign exchange market. Two
types of instability should be distinguished: the
turmoil that surrounds speculation against a
pegged exchange rate; and the volatility that
seems to characterize floating rates. The defense
of pegged rates, especially when it is ultimately
unsuccessful, is most likely to be classified as a
currency “crisis.” In such a case, it can be argued
that the problem is as much one of policy as of
market instability. Should the authorities have
selected a fixed rate regime? Should they have
changed the peg (or the regime) earlier? Should
they have pursued a different mix of policies?
Some have argued, however, that attacks on a
fixed peg can also be speculatively induced.
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Where there are dual or multiple equilibria in
exchange rate relationships, the movement from
one to another may owe more to market dynam-
ics than to fundamentals.
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is harder to explain, especially when movements
in fundamentals are modest. Swings in relative
real values among the U.S. dollar, Deutsche
Mark and Japanese Yen have approached 50
percent or more in the past decade and a half.
Such swings complicate macroeconomic policies;
generate the potential for resource misallocation
and give rise to protectionist pressures. While it
can be argued that exchange markets are respond-
ing to policy divergences (actual and expected),
the link is often not at all clear.
Secondly, instability in equity markets can
also have external consequences. Stock market
volatility can undermine the stability of finan-
cial institutions who are directly or indirectly
exposed to equity prices; exacerbate the invest-
ment cycle (via Tobin’s “q”); and, if prices fall
sharply, have adverse effects on confidence.
However, although stock market crashes have a
fascination for lay opinion, the impact of equity
price instability has for most of the time been
relatively mild. This may be because there are
nonlinearities at work. Modest movements in
equity values do little if any harm; but a larger
movement has a disproportionately greater po-
tential both to set up self-perpetuating forces and
to do real economic damage.
Thirdly, much the same can be said of price
fluctuations in bond markets. Despite the gener-
alized run-up in bond yields in 1994, adverse
spillovers were rather well contained. So long
as the central bank is thought able to stabilize
inflation, the scope for extreme movements in
bond prices is limited.
Fourthly and finally, real estate, though not
strictly speaking a financial asset, can be subject
to “bubble” phenomena. A real estate bubble
complicates the formulation of monetary policy
while it is being created, and can leave a string
of failures in its wake when it bursts. Some of
the difficulties faced in mid-1997 by Southeast
Asian economies can be traced, in part to real
estate bubbles.
What should be concluded from the foregoing
brief survey? If there are disequilibrium tenden-
cies in financial and other asset markets, and if
price volatility has had adverse spillover conse-
quences, does this argue for making the stability
of asset prices a focus of public policy concern
in the same way as the stability of financial
institutions?
Here the answer is, at best, not clear-cut. Few
economists would be confident that govern-
ments could be better at determining equilib-
rium prices than markets. Even when prices
move by an amount that is clearly greater than
“fundamentals” justify, it can rarely be said that
the price was more appropriate before the move
than after it. And frequently, the blame for price
volatility is due to unstable policies just as much
as to unstable markets. So the broad consensus
among economists (with which I agree) is that
official policy to stabilize financial asset prices
should be focused more on sustainable policies
and removing market imperfections, than on
direct actions to limit price movements.
One should recognize that there can, occasion-
ally, be exceptions to this general rule. When
currencies become substantially misaligned (as
in 1985, say), governments may try to give a lead
to markets (albeit through statements concern-
ing policies). And if domestic asset prices were
to fall to an extent that threatened financial
stability, it would not be surprising to see a
policy response aimed at stabilizing prices. In
fact, central banks responded to the 1987 stock
market crash by easing the provision of liquidity
to financial markets. In general, however, offi-
cial responses to extreme price movements tend
to be ad hoc, rather than part of a cohesive
“policy” on financial market stability. 
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FINANCIAL STABILITY
The foregoing section has listed a number of
reasons why financial instability has negative
externalities. These are probably sufficient to
make achieving and maintaining stability a pub-
lic policy goal. It is of less help, however, in
determining how public authorities should pro-
mote stability. This section reviews several
broad approaches to promoting stability, imply-
ing varying degrees of intervention by the
authorities. The principal focus is on policies to
promote stability at financial institutions, since
these have been the subject of more coherent
analysis. At the end of the section, however,
there are a few observations on preventing in-
stability in key market prices.
Reliance on market forces
With the possible exception of New Zealand,
where certain special circumstances apply, no
countries have adopted the position that market
forces can be relied on as the sole guarantor of
stability at financial institutions. But while offi-
cial support for the pure market solution is lim-
ited, there is a stronger academic tradition in this
vein, going back to the free banking school, and
finding recent expression in the writing of
Dowd.
12 Other academics have questioned
whether the contagion effect that lies behind
official concern with systemic stability is in
reality all that significant.
13
The case for the market solution is, to simplify,
as follows: when all actors, including depositors,
counterparties, managers, and shareholders of
financial institutions realize they are “on their
own,” they will exercise a much higher degree
of care, and financial institutions will thereby be
forced to operate in a sounder and more prudent
fashion. The failure of an individual institution
will become less likely, and the risk of systemic
contagion will be almost nonexistent. The moral
hazard implied by official intervention will be
removed, with favorable consequences for the
efficiency of resource allocation.
The case against can be put on several levels.
Most fundamentally, it is argued that there are
events that may occur very infrequently, that
cannot be predicted, and that have the capacity
to destabilize the financial system if not resisted.
These could include political events such as the
outbreak of war or the election of radical gov-
ernments; economic events, such as the 1929
stock market crash; or natural disasters such as
a major earthquake in a large metropolitan cen-
ter. If governments were to stand aside from
helping the financial system under such extraor-
dinary circumstances, financial institutions
would have to carry such a large cushion of
capital as to greatly reduce their capacity to
contribute to economic welfare in normal times.
More prosaically, it is pointed out by Goodhart
and others that political pressures make it very
hard for elected authorities to refuse assistance
to institutions whose depositors have powerful
electoral influence.
14 Since most market partici-
pants know this, any ex ante announcement by
governments not to support the financial system
lacks credibility. Moral hazard is not, therefore,
avoided. Thus, despite the attraction of reliance
on market forces, most observers accept that it
is insufficient, by itself, to guarantee stability in
all circumstances.
Safety nets
The most effective way of ensuring continued
confidence in financial institutions is to provide
their users with some sort of explicit safety net.
The main types of safety net are deposit insur-
ance schemes, and the presence of a lender of
last resort. The primary drawback of safety nets
is moral hazard, which appears in a particularly
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positors have no incentive to monitor the insti-
tutions with whom they place their funds.
Borrowing institutions are therefore able to pur-
sue risky strategies and, at the limit, to “gamble
for resurrection” when their capital has been
eroded. The potential for imprudent behavior is
exemplified by the savings and loan episode in
the United States.
Various means have been suggested to address
the moral hazard issue. These include limiting
the coverage of deposit insurance, charging risk-
based insurance premia, and limiting insurance
coverage to a specific category of institutions
(100 percent reserve banks). None is entirely
satisfactory. Limiting the coverage of insurance
schemes means that uninsured depositors can
still precipitate a “run” when they fear for bank
solvency. Risk-based insurance premia are dif-
ficult to calculate on a formulaic basis. And 100
percent reserve banking, despite impressive aca-
demic support from Henry Simons to Milton
Friedman and James Tobin, has never gained
much support.
15 Probably most observers con-
clude that 100 percent reserve banks would not
be successful in winning a major share of the
market during normal times, and therefore the
issue of how to safeguard stability at other insti-
tutions would not go away.
Lender-of-last-resort support has been a rec-
ognized role of central banks since Bagehot. The
object is to provide support to solvent but illiq-
uid institutions to avoid the possibility that they
would have to liquidate assets in a “fire sale”
that would generate losses and lead to an avoid-
able insolvency. Aside from the practical diffi-
culty of distinguishing between insolvency and
illiquidity, the lender-of-last-resort role does not
avoid the problem of moral hazard.
16 One an-
swer to this is “constructive ambiguity”—a
phrase made popular by Jerry Corrigan meaning
that central banks reserve the right to intervene
to preserve stability but give no assurances,
explicit or implicit, to individual institutions.
Such an approach is intended to make institu-
tions act more prudently by making them uncer-
tain whether they would be rescued in a crisis.
In some circumstances, however, “constructive
ambiguity” may turn out to be a cloak for “too
big to fail,” if the lender of last resort is more
willing to take the risk of allowing a small
institution to go under than a large one. 
Regulation
If there were no safety net, regulation would
be justified by the need to protect the interests
of depositors and other creditors. With a safety
net, the justification shifts to one of protecting
the deposit insurance fund (often taxpayers) and
avoiding moral hazard. In practice the focus of
regulation has shifted significantly over time,
and may now be in the process of a further shift.
Three different focuses for regulation can be
distinguished.
Regulation to protect franchise values. Until
about 20 years ago, regulation in most countries
had the effect of limiting competition in the
financial industry. Entry to the industry was
controlled, there were restrictions on interest
rate competition, and cartel-type practices were
tolerated. In a number of countries, including the
U.S. and Japan, there was strict segregation
between commercial and investment banking
activities. Since franchise values were high as a
result, losses were less likely and, when they did
occur, more often led to industry-sponsored
takeover or rescue than to outright failure.
Several developments in the 1970s and 1980s
undermined this form of regulation. The grow-
ing dominance of the free market philosophy
made protective practices less acceptable. Lib-
eralization and deregulation increased competi-
tion which in turn eroded banks’ profitability
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thin capital cushions, this made banks more
vulnerable to adverse external shocks. As a re-
sult regulation to limit competition and bolster
the profitability of financial institutions was no
longer a practicable or acceptable means of
ensuring systemic stability. 
Risk-based capital adequacy. In recent years
the dominant form of regulation to promote
systemic stability has been risk-based capital
adequacy. Instead of limiting banks’ activities,
regulators have sought to ensure that banks are
adequately capitalized against the risks they run.
This is the philosophy behind a series of docu-
ments issued by the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision. Supervisors have divided assets
into a number of “risk classes” and specified the
amount of capital to be held against each.
Such an approach has several advantages. The
notion of relating capital to risk is in conformity
with the reason financial institutions hold capi-
tal in the first place. And the increased capitali-
zation of the banking system that has followed
from the decisions of the Basle Committee has
undoubtedly improved systemic resiliency.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the way the
approach has been implemented have drawbacks,
which are becoming increasingly recognized.
Firstly, and most importantly, there is the po-
tential for a discrepancy between risk, as calcu-
lated by the financial institution itself, and risk
as measured by regulatory criteria. To take two
obvious examples: the Basle Committee risk
weights make no distinction between high and
low quality credits within the same risk weight
category (e.g., between a AAA borrower and a
junk bond issuer); nor do they take account of
the possibility of risk reduction through diversi-
fication. Most financial firms now find that there
is a significant discrepancy between the “eco-
nomic capital” they consider appropriate to
cover the total risk of their portfolio and the
“regulatory capital” they are required to hold
under the Basle ratios. 
This would not matter much from the view-
point of stability if the only problem were an
excess of prudence on the part of supervisors.
Indeed, it could well have advantages, since the
additional capital cushion required by supervi-
sors could be considered the “price” to be paid
for the safety net provided by the lender of last
resort. As some writers have pointed out, how-
ever, this is not the only implication. Even ad-
justing for supervisory caution, a portfolio’s
riskiness may appear significantly different
when internal risk models are used than when
the Basle risk weights are applied. It is possible
for banks with higher risk appetites to deliber-
ately add risk to their portfolios (e.g., through
the use of credit derivatives) without having an
effect on the regulatory capital required to meet
the Basle ratios.
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A second problem with the current approach
is that it focuses only on certain categories of
risk. One gap in the original Basle Accord has
now been plugged with the extension of capital
requirements to market risk as well as credit
risk. But several of the most recent examples of
serious losses in the financial sector have come
from operational risk (Barings, Daiwa), legal
risk (swaps with UK local authorities) and
model risk (Metallgesellschaft). As a result of
these perceived shortcomings, growing atten-
tion is now being given to using regulation to
better harness market incentives in support of
stability. 
Regulation to support market forces. In any
market, self-regulation is a powerful force. The
strongest incentive to act with prudence and integ-
rity comes from those with most to lose when
they fail to do so. Recent thinking has therefore
focused on ways of strengthening the incentives
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affairs prudently and on their counterparties to
exercise appropriate discipline: in the jargon,
“incentive-compatible financial regulation.”
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Consider the assessment of risk. The manag-
ers of a financial institution have a strong incen-
tive to monitor accurately their risk exposure. It
therefore seems likely that an internal assess-
ment of risk will be a better measure than a
simplified external formula. This philosophy
has been accepted by the Basle Committee and
incorporated in the market risk amendment to
the Capital Accord. The market risk amendment
allows firms to use their own models (subject to
external validation) to measure the risk in their
trading portfolio then prescribes a “multiplica-
tion” factor which translates value at risk into
required capital holding.
It seems, therefore, as though the debate is
moving towards a distinction between the mea-
surement of risk, which is best done by those
who are closest to the portfolio, and have the
tools to do it; and the capitalization of risk,
decisions on which raise public policy issues.
Since the authorities, by underwriting the stabil-
ity of the financial system are in essence provid-
ing financial institutions with catastrophic risk
insurance, it is legitimate for them to limit the
potential recourse to such insurance by requir-
ing a minimum level of capital holding.
Conceivably, one could go even further and
assign responsibility for decisions on capital hold-
ing to the private sector as well. This is the
philosophy behind the so-called “pre-commit-
ment” approach. An institution would itself
choose how much capital it would assign to
cover the value at risk in its portfolio. If losses
exceeded the calculated probability, then the
institution would be subject to some kind of
penalty. This is an intriguing idea, though it
would present a number of complex practical
issues. Moreover, it is not clear that it would lead
to an appropriate pricing of the safety net.
The idea of harnessing self-disciplining forces
is also behind the proposal of the Group of
Thirty to develop industry-led standards for risk
management, internal operating controls and
public disclosure.
19 The proposal would call for
major international institutions to commit to
standards that they would undertake to meet
themselves and to require of their counterpar-
ties. When endorsed by supervisors, these would
then presumably spread, through market pres-
sures, to all institutions. Being developed by
practitioners, these standards, it is argued, are
more likely to provide an appropriate balance
between benefits and costs. In particular, by
allowing the industry to propose more efficient
ways of reducing risk, they would reduce the
danger that firms would cut corners in an effort
to avoid burdensome official regulation.
Before ending this section, a word should be
added on policies to preserve stability in finan-
cial market prices. Theory provides much less
help in addressing this issue than that of stability
in financial institutions. Certain approaches to
providing a more stable market environment
would not be controversial. These include the
encouragement of stable and sustainable macro-
economic policies; fuller disclosure and dis-
semination of relevant financial data; and the
outlawing of anticompetitive practices in finan-
cial markets. Other measures have also attracted
a measure of support, such as the use of “circuit-
breakers” when prices move by more than a
certain threshold amount.
What to do when a significant “bubble” is
thought to be developing, or when a bubble
bursts, is a matter on which there is little
agreement. Public authorities can warn about
“irrational exuberance,” but central bankers are
in general unwilling to adjust macroeconomic
20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpolicy to stabilize financial asset prices. If prices
were to fall, the reaction might be different, if only
because experience suggests that price falls tend
to be more rapid and disorderly than price rises.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
There is persuasive evidence that financial
stability provides a favorable environment for
efficient resource allocation and more rapid eco-
nomic growth.
20 Instability has been associated
with lower levels of saving and investment,
fiscal costs, and setbacks to GNP. It is, therefore,
unavoidable that securing stability should be a
concern of public policy authorities.
What is less clear, however, is whether the
maintenance of stability requires an activist ap-
proach on the part of the authorities, or alterna-
tively whether it can best be achieved by
reliance on market forces. Arguments against a
pure laissez-faire approach include the follow-
ing: that there are disequilibrium tendencies
within the financial system that can, via conta-
gion, turn instability into crisis; and that the
costs of a financial crisis for economic welfare
are so great that it is irresponsible to take
chances. On the other hand, too great a level of
support for the financial system, or support in
inappropriate ways, can lead to inefficiency and
moral hazard.
A consensus therefore seems to be developing
among central bankers that regulation should, as
far as possible, be directed at reinforcing the
self-disciplining tendencies of the market. This
probably means less detailed or prescriptive
regulation, and a greater reliance on the internal
controls of market participants, supported by
mechanisms that sharpen the incentive for pru-
dent behavior.
It may be worth ending with a few observa-
tions on regulatory structure. A tendency has
developed in recent years to draw a distinction
between the function of institutional supervi-
sion; responsibility for systemic stability; and
responsibility for price stability. These are indeed
separate functions, and there may be cases in
which the pursuit of any one of them is handi-
capped by the simultaneous pursuit of the others.
There are also powerful linkages, however.
Systemic stability is linked to the health of the
individual institutions that comprise the system;
and instability in the financial system can both
cause and be caused by instability in the real
economy. What this means is that there must be
close collaboration between those responsible
for monetary and financial stability, respec-
tively, and that both must be aware of the finan-
cial condition of the key institutions. Moreover,
in order not to stifle innovation, all concerned
need to have a healthy respect for market forces
and recognize the need, in a market economy,
for bankruptcy as an ultimate sanction for
unsuccessful enterprises.
This does not lead to any universally applicable
conclusions concerning regulatory structure. It
should, however, give pause to those who be-
lieve that separating functions is a straightfor-
ward and costless measure to tackle perceived
shortcomings in present arrangements.
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